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Chapter 21
A Theoretical Risk Management Framework
for Vessels Operating Near Offshore Wind
Farms
Raza Ali Mehdi and Jens-Uwe Schröder-Hinrichs
Abstract The design of an offshore wind farm (OWF) can have a major impact
on the safety of maritime operations in the vicinity. Factors such as the number of
turbines, turbine spacing, and tower design can all have an effect the probability
and consequences of various maritime accidents. The current chapter describes the
potential effects of offshore wind farms on maritime traffic—particularly in a safety,
reliability and risk context. The chapter also reviews existing methods, models and
frameworks that can be used to assess the risk to maritime operations. Lastly, the
authors propose an improved theoretical risk management framework that addresses
some present concerns.
21.1 The Need for Maritime Risk Management Around
Offshore Wind Farms
In this first section, the status of the OWF industry and the need for maritime risk
management around wind farms is described.
21.1.1 Trends in the OWF Industry
Over the past few decades, there has been a sharp increase in the use of renewable
energy—driven not only by a more mindful society, but also by strong policy
instruments and decisions. One of the most popular renewable energy schemes is
wind energy. As the demand for energy generation grows, an increasing number
of wind turbines are being installed offshore. OWFs offer several advantages over
their onshore equivalents. There is better wind resource, and the wind speeds are
more consistent out at sea. Potentially, wind turbines can also be scaled up to much
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greater sizes than would be possible onshore—leading to increased, more efficient,
energy generation. In Europe, on average, an offshore wind turbine has a capacity of
3.6 MW and generates 12,961 MWh of energy annually; by comparison an onshore
turbine has an average capacity of 2.2 MW, and generates around 4702 MWh of
energy (EWEA 2015).
OWFs can also be constructed close enough to heavily populated shores to reduce
energy transport cost, and yet be distant enough not to cause visual and noise
pollution (Anderson 2013). These factors, combined—to some extent—with limited
space on land, have led to an increased exploitation of marine areas for wind energy
generation. As a result, offshore wind turbines are increasingly rapidly in size and
numbers. Wind farms are also getting larger and moving further ashore so as to
better exploit wind resource.
There are, however, certain drawbacks of OWFs that also need to be taken into
account. The drawbacks include harsh environmental conditions for construction
and maintenance, limitations in deep water installation technology, and impacts on
the marine environment (Anderson 2013). These disadvantages, coupled with the
high cost of capital investment, maintenance and reliability mean that OWFs are not
as cost-effective or efficient as their onshore equivalents today; in fact, by certain
estimates, the costs of operation and maintenance (O&M) for OWFs may be 2–6
times higher than those for onshore wind (Dalgic et al. 2013).
21.1.2 The Need for Maritime Risk Assessment
and Management
Building an OWF has an impact on vessel operations in the vicinity. A wind farm
leads to more obstructions in the water for ships to avoid; the presence of a wind
farm near a shipping lane effectively narrows the area in which vessels can operate,
therefore increasing the traffic density. This may lead to additional costs for the
maritime industry—if for example, the vessels have to be diverted to sail along a
longer route.
Perhaps more importantly, there is also an increased risk of accidents due to
the increased maritime traffic as a result of activities related to OWFs. In addition
to the increased traffic density, and reduced sea space, wind turbines may also
cause problems with a ship’s on-board navigation equipment. In fact, the potential
accidents that maritime operations face due to offshore wind farms can be classified
into five different categories.
• Navigational accidents involving passing vessels (Powered and Drifting)
• Navigational accidents involving wind farm support vessels
• Accidents during OWF installation and decommissioning operations
• Accidents during emergency maritime operations such as SAR
• Accidents in harbours and ports that deal with offshore activities
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In addition to the risk-areas mentioned above, an OWF may also affect the safety
of pleasure vessels and fishing operations; these areas, however, are beyond the
scope of the current research.
Any of the maritime accidents listed above, if they occur in the vicinity of an
OWF, may cause a farm-wide shutdown, or lead to a severe delay in installation,
repair or maintenance services—thus leading to higher costs. In the worst case
scenarios, maritime accidents may not only damage the vessels, but also the
turbines—leading to further downtime and increased repair costs, thereby reducing
the reliability of offshore wind even further. According to the findings of Dai et al.
(2013), a fairly small support vessel with 230 tones displacement, colliding head-on
with the landing structure on a turbine tower at a speed of just 0.48 m/s, would be
enough to induce local yield in the structure; colliding a speed of 0.84 m/s with the
landing structure would induce global yield. Conversely, the same vessel colliding
head-on directly with the tower would cause local yield and global yield at speeds
of 0.34 m/s and 0.55 m/s respectively. Such reports clearly highlight the need for
thorough risk management.
Risk management may also be a legal or regulatory necessity—national, and
international standards, e.g. BSH (2015) and MCA (2013), may require wind farm
owners to demonstrate that their OWF will not impede the safety of maritime
operations. In Germany, for instance, there are very clear guidelines which state
that accidents near OWFs should not happen more than once every 100 years. Wind
turbines installed in Germany must also be collision-friendly—if an accident does
occur, it is preferable for the turbine to be damaged, so the vessel does not rupture
or cause an oil spill1 (BSH 2015).
In summary, a thorough risk management process can serve two very important
purposes—avoiding costly accidents, and demonstrating the safety and reliability of
an OWF. This makes good risk management frameworks invaluable to stakeholders
from both the maritime and OWF industries.
21.2 Literature Review
When discussing risk management, it is firstly important to define the term risk in
a theoretical context. Based on a thorough literature review, risk has be defined as
‘a combination of the probability and consequences of undesirable events that arise
due to a permutation of passive hazards and active failures in a system or a process’
by the current authors.
1A 160,000 DWT vessel drifting sideways into a turbine at a speed of 2 m/s is often considered as
a typical reference case, unless the vessels on a particular route significantly differ in size.
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Risk, as a concept, has been widely researched in recent decades. Despite the
varying opinions about the actual definition of the term, most authors agree that no
system or process is ever risk-free. The risk associated with one system or a process
may also have an impact on other ‘external’ systems or processes.
Subsequently, risk assessment and risk management have emerged as two very
vital concepts. Risk assessment is an integral part of risk management and refers to
the use of tools, methods, models and frameworks to assess the risk associated with
a system. Once the risk to a system has been assessed, the next step is to evaluate,
control and/or monitor the risk; the combination of these latter three steps and the
risk assessment process is risk management. The International Risk Governance
Council (IRGC) defines risk management as ‘the process of analysing, selecting,
implementing, and evaluating actions to reduce risk’ (IRGC 2006).
To develop a risk management framework, one must also understand the
differences between the three terms methods, models and framework.
A risk assessment method can be thought of as a recipe—it provides
step-by-step guidance on assessing the risk associated with a system or a process.
A non-exhaustive list of risk assessment methods would include Fault Tree Analyses
(FTAs), Event Tree Analyses (ETAs), Risk Contribution Trees (RCTs), Failure
mode, effects and criticality analyses (FMEAs/FMECAs), and Bayesian Networks
(BNs).
Risk assessment models, on the other hand, are replications of real-life systems
and processes. Models can be developed using the step-by-step approach provided
by a method, although this is not always the case—some simpler models can be
developed without the explicit help of a specific method.
A framework is an overarching ‘outline’ which can consist of several methods,
models and other tools. A risk assessment framework may include guidance as to
what should be done before and after the actual risk assessment. For example, a
framework may specify what data needs to be collected for an assessment and
where/how it can be obtained. Similarly, a risk management framework might
elaborate on what to do with the results of the risk assessment, and how to
interpret them in a meaningful manner, through the use of tools such risk matrices
and principles such as ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable). A risk
management framework may also contain guidance on the selection and evaluation
of different risk control measures, through techniques such as cost-benefit analysis.
Although a detailed review of risk assessment methods is out of scope for this
book chapter, a review of different risk, probability and consequence assessment
models and frameworks is presented in the following sections.
21.2.1 Maritime Risk Assessment Models for OWFs
Various authors, over the years, have developed maritime risk assessment models
for many scenarios—so much so that a complete, exhaustive review is nigh
impossible. Review texts range from complete books, to comparison and review
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papers (Goerlandt and Montewka 2015; Amdahl et al. 2013; Li et al. 2012; Pedersen
2010; Wang et al. 2002; Soares and Teixeira 2001). It is therefore unfeasible, and
redundant, to have a detailed discussion of the various risk assessment models in
this report. A brief, categorical overview is, however, prudent.
Risk assessment models can be categorized in many different ways. Some models
can be used to calculate the probability of maritime accidents, whilst others focus on
the consequences of these accidents. There are models that deal exclusively with a
given type of accident, and some models that are applicable to many different types
of accidents. For the purpose of this chapter, the author has categorized the risk
assessment models based on whether they evaluate the probability, or consequences
of accidents. Only models that can be used for maritime risk assessment of maritime
operations around offshore wind farms are discussed. The models reviewed cover
the risk of contact, collision and grounding events.
21.2.1.1 Probability Models
Geometric – Causation Probability Models for Powered Accidents
A commonly-used method to assess the probability of navigational accidents was
proposed by MacDuff (1974). He suggested that the total probability of an accident
along a waterway could be expressed as a multiplication of two factors—the
‘geometric probability of accident’, multiplied by a ‘causation probability’. This
class of methods is applicable to powered accidents—where a vessel is still under
the control of the crew.
Geometric Probability of Accidents
The geometric probability of accidents is simply the probability of an accident
occurring if no evasive measures are taken. It essentially indicates how often, and
how many, vessels deviate from their ‘normal’ route onto a course that could lead
to an accident. Depending on the type of accident, there are many different ways
to assess and calculate the geometrical probability of accidents. The most common
method is to look at vessel AIS (Automatic Identification System) data for an area,
and see how many vessels deviate from their course over a given period of time.
The deviation of the vessels generally depends not only on physical and technical
factors related to vessel ways (width of vessel way, marking of objects, aids to
navigations, etc.), but also on human factors. A probability distribution of vessel
deviations can be created using AIS information, which can be used to assess future
case scenarios. Generally, AIS data and probability distributions are enough to
calculate the geometric probability of contact (accidents between ships and fixed
structures) and grounding accidents (Ellis et al. 2008b; Christensen 2007; Kleissen
2006; ANATEC 2014). AIS data can also be combined with marine spatial data,
and information such as bathymetry and geography, to assess the risk of contact or
grounding events (Hansen et al. 2013).
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The calculation of the geometric probability of accidents can be enhanced
by taking into account additional factors—particularly in collision scenarios. For
instance, MacDuff (1974) derived a simplified equation to determine the geometric
collision candidates based on the manoeuvrability of a vessel, and the width
of a channel. Fujii and Tanaka (1971) proposed an equation which took into
consideration the traffic density, and the relative speed of colliding vessels. Fujii
and Tanaka (1971) also pioneered the concept of a ‘collision diameter’ or ‘ship
domain’. A ‘collision diameter’ is essentially an area enveloping a ship, which—if
encroached by another ship—would lead to an imminent collision; this diameter or
domain can be calculated using factors such as ship size, manoeuvring capabilities,
waterway geometry, and laws of motion (Li et al. 2012).
The concept of a ‘collision diameters’ and ‘ship domains’ has been developed
further by authors such as Pedersen (2010), Kaneko (2002, 2013) and Montewka
et al. (2010b, 2011, 2012)—who have derived their own equations to estimate
the number of geometric collision candidates; the latter have developed a concept
called ‘Minimum Distance to Collision’ (MDTC), which incorporates the physical
properties of vessels, ship dynamics and even the traffic patterns in an area to assess
the risk of ship-ship collisions (Montewka et al. 2012). Equations that incorporate
principles of ship domain, in combination with vessel traffic data, are also often
used in tools like iWRAP (Friis-Hansen 2008).
Causation Probability of Accidents
The geometric probability, alone, is not enough to assess the probability of an
accident; another important value that needs to be assessed is the causation
probability. If a vessel is on an accident course, but manages to correct the course in
time, the accident can be avoided; thus, the causation probability is essentially the
probability of evasion measures being undertaken by a vessel on an accident course.
When the values of geometric probability and causation probability are combined,
one can calculate the total probability of a given type of accident.
Causation probabilities are often harder to quantify. MacDuff (1974), Fujii and
Yamanouchi (1974), and Fujii et al. (1974) determined causation probabilities
through observations, and by considering historical data, to see how often ‘incorrect’
vessel deviations were corrected before an accident occurred. They came up with
specific values of causation probabilities, which are tabulated and still commonly
used in modern risk assessment studies and tools—despite the fact that these
values were for specific maritime areas, from a time long gone. To compensate for
this, these outdated causation probability values may be multiplied by a constant
factor to provide a conservative estimate, and to reflect the assumption that modern
technology has made navigation safer.
Rather than estimating a causation probability based on observations alone, some
authors prefer to calculate it instead. Depending on the type of accident being
analysed, causation probabilities can be calculated in different ways. Calculating
causation probability of contact incidents, for example, requires one to take into
consideration factors such as the location, and size of a fixed object. Similarly,
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to calculate the probability of grounding events, one may have to consider the
hydrographic and bathymetric features of a sea area. Causation probabilities
equations may be functions of various physical parameters such as vessel speed,
vessel type, distance between vessel and accident area/object, and traffic density.
Causation probabilities are also heavily dependent on the so-called ‘human
element’—i.e.—the capabilities of human beings on board the ship. Human reliabil-
ity techniques such as HEART (Human error assessment and reduction technique)
and THERP (Technique for human error-rate prediction) can be used to quantify the
frequency of human error.
Various studies have also quantified the effect of factors such as weather, and
bad visibility conditions, on the causation probability (Larsen 1993). Some recent
studies of causation probabilities also take into account the effect of technical and
technological factors, such as coastal state facilities, VTS, and aids to navigation
(Lehn-Schiøler et al. 2013). Technical factors - such as rudder or engine failure -
can also influence the causation probability (Hänninen and Kujala 2012).
The socio-technical factors required to estimate causation probabilities may be
intrinsically linked. As such, causation probabilities are often calculated through
sophisticated risk assessment methods such as Fault Trees, Event Tress (Fowler
and Sørgård 2000; Haugen 1991) and Bayesian Networks (Akhtar and Utne 2013;
Dai et al. 2013; Hänninen et al. 2013; Hänninen and Kujala 2012; Szwed et al.
2006; Friis-Hansen 2000; Friis-Hansen and Simonsen 2002). Using risk assessment
methods can allow various factors—such as human and organizational errors,
configuration of the navigational area, navigational aids and markings, bathymetry,
and coastal state features such as VTS—to be taken into consideration (Friis-Hansen
2008).
To a certain extent, even the most sophisticated causation probability estimates
rely on historical data, and the best way to quantify such data is through the use
of accident investigation models—best demonstrated by authors such as Mazaheri
et al. (2015b), and Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2011). Data gathered through accident
investigation models can, in turn, be used as an input to risk assessment methods—
and thus augment causation probability calculations further.
Other Probability Models for Powered Accidents
The overarching principle to assess the probability of accidents—by combining the
geometrical and causation probabilities, as suggested by MacDuff—is still widely
used today. There are, however, other ways to assess the probability of accidents in
the maritime domain as well.
ANATEC (2014), for example, calculate the probability of collisions by dividing
a sea area into a number of cells, and considering the traffic density and number of
potential encounters in each cell based on AIS data.
One may also rely solely on past accident data to identify a potentially dangerous
sea area. A good example for such proactive accident data use can be found in the
work of Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2011); in this study, the authors assessed previous
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occurrences of engine room fires to determine what equipment and ship areas were
most susceptible to such accidents.
Ohlson (2013) suggests the use of risk assessment methods like FMECA to
calculate, amongst other factors, the probability of accidents close to OWFs. Van
LU (2012) analysed and compared the usefulness of methods such as FMECA, FTA,
ETA, Checklist Method and SWIFT. He also extended his work to cover human
reliability methods such as THERP, HEART, ASEP and SPAR-H.
Geijerstam and Svensson (2008) identified several factors that should be taken
into consideration when performing a qualitative risk assessment for OWFs; in
some cases, such factors, combined with simple expert judgements can be used to
qualitatively determine if the chances of accidents are ‘high’ or ‘low’, for instance.
Probability Models for Drifting Accidents
Drifting accidents are accidents in which the crew is no longer able to control the
vessel—usually due to an engine or steering system/rudder failure. Drifting vessels
are more prone to contact and grounding incidents.
Therefore, the first step in calculating the probability of drifting accidents is to
calculate the probability of engine or rudder failure, whilst a vessel is in an area
where there are other structures or shallow water depths.
One should also take into consideration the sea space available, and the wind
and weather conditions in an area—as these factors determine how much a time is
available for the vessel to perform corrective action or repairs. If for example, the
wind and wave conditions are favourable, and the drift speed is very low, the crew
may actually be able to repair the engine or rudder before an accident takes place.
The probability of a vessel anchoring safely before a drifting accident occurs,
or being towed to safety by tug vessels, should also be considered. Most modern
drifting models and frameworks have specific time functions based on historic ship
data, which allow users to assess the time available to a drifting vessel based on
all the aforementioned factors (SAFESHIP 2006; Kleissen 2006; van der Tak 2010;
Christensen 2007; Ellis et al. 2008b).
21.2.1.2 Consequence Models
Work on modelling the consequences of maritime accidents was pioneered by in the
1950s (Minorsky 1959). Since then, various authors have developed many different
consequence assessment models.
As demonstrated by Wang et al. (2002), consequence models can be categorized
in many different ways. There are models, for instance, that deal with either internal
or external mechanics of ship collisions. Some models take into consideration the
deformation of a ship’s bow, whilst others may not. Alternatively, models may be
classified depending on the type of accident they were developed for—collision,
contact or grounding models. Lastly, models can be classified on the type of analysis
they perform; this is the classification used in this chapter.
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Empirical, Analytical, and Probabilistic Consequence Models
Minorsky (1959) proposed to separate the external mechanics and internal mechan-
ics of accidents. External mechanics are generally based on the equations of motions
of, and the kinetic energy of the vessel(s) involved. Principles of conservation of
energy, momentum and angular momentum (Wang et al. 2002) are generally applied
when assessing the external mechanics of ship accidents. Pedersen and Zhang
(1998), Zhang (1999), and Pedersen (2014) have done some pioneering work on
the external mechanics of ship accidents. Other authors (Simonsen 1997; Paik and
Thayamballi 2007) have developed equations for similar approaches.
The internal mechanics study the actual structural and material failure in given
accidents. Analysis methods for internal mechanics can be further divided into many
sub-categories, based on the type of analysis, and the equations used. Minorsky
(1959), for instance developed empirical equations to model the internal mechanics
of ship accidents—particularly damage length and penetration—based on past
data. Pedersen and Zhang (1998) developed Minorsky’s work further, and Zhang
(1999) derived semi-empirical, semi-analytical equations for internal mechanics,
improving Minorsky’s original empirical equations for ship damage.
Pedersen (2002, 2010, 2013, 2014), Pedersen et al. (1993), Zhang (1999), Lützen
(2001), Chen (2000), Brown (2001, 2002a, b), Brown and Chen (2002), and Lin
(2008), amongst others, have also developed analytical models for analysis of
internal mechanics problem.
The analytical models developed by Pedersen (2002, 2010, 2013, 2014) focus
mainly on the kinetic energy dissipation, and are based on factors such as mass,
speed, and angles and location of collision and contact along the ship length. Brown
and Chen (2002) have further developed the programme SIMCOL (Chen 2000;
Brown 2002a), which can quickly assess the damage length and penetration depth,
with varying parameters such as angle of collision, and speed of ships. Ehlers and
Tabri (2012) have developed a robust model to assess the damage to a ship through
a semi-analytical, semi-numerical procedure. Tools like GRACAT (Friis-Hansen
and Simonsen 2002) have also been developed based on analytical and empirical
equations, and can help to assess, and visualize, the damage to ships in an integrated
manner—users are able to calculate everything from the probability of collisions and
grounding, to the oil outflows and capsizing time.
Aside from considering external and internal mechanics, probabilistic damage
assessment is also very common when assessing the consequences of ship accidents.
Such models are essentially an offshoot of empirical models, and rely primarily
on past accident data. Ronza et al. (2003) and Ellis et al. (2008a) used Event
Trees, developed using past-accident data, to predict likely future case accidents
and consequences. Probabilistic models have been used by the IMO in Formal
Safety Assessment studies—not only to predict environmental damage, but also to
assess the stability of ships, effectiveness of evacuations and potential loss of lives
(IMO 2008). Organizations like ANATEC (2014) also use accident statistics and
subsequent predictive estimates to assess the consequences of maritime accidents
near OWFs.
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Goerlandt and Montewka (2014), amongst others, have developed thorough and
robust probabilistic consequence models using methods such as Bayesian Networks,
fault trees, and event trees (Li et al. 2012). Similar work has been carried out by
Vanem and Skjong (2004), Mazaheri (2009), Montewka (2009), Montewka et al.
(2010a, 2014a, b), van de Wiel and van Dorp (2011), Ståhlberg et al. (2013), and
Helle et al. (2015), amongst other authors. Some of these aforementioned authors
have combined tree-based diagrams with neural networks, and augmented their
findings with past accident-data, for further validity.
Finite Element (Numerical) Consequence Models
External and internal mechanics can also be assessed using simplified Finite
Element Methods (FEM). Ito et al. (1985) and Paik et al. (1999)—amongst others—
have done substantial work in this area. In recent years, with advances in computing,
non-linear FEM simulations have become increasingly popular, for the level of
detail they are able to capture. Authors like Xia (2001) and Kitamura (2002) have
demonstrated the use of FEM for collision and grounding accidents.
Non-linear FEM offers a very robust solution to analyse complex systems like
a turbine-vessel collision. Amongst others, Servis and Samuelides (1999) and Xia
(2001) have developed FE models for ship-ship collisions, whilst Dalhoff and Biehl
(2005), Biehl and Lehmann (2006), Dai et al. (2013), and Bela et al. (2015) have
all published papers on FEM for ship-turbine collisions. FEM can also be used to
model the damage on the turbine itself, as demonstrated by Ozguc et al. (2006),
Le Sourne et al. (2015), Ren and Ou (2009), Ramberg (2011), Kroondijk (2012),
Pichler et al. (2012), Samsonovs et al. (2014), Ding et al. (2014), and Hsieh (2015);
such models are invaluable as they can incorporate factors such as blade rotation and
soil-structure interaction, thus being able to provide an in-depth analysis of contact
events. Cho et al. (2013) describe experimental investigations to validate numerical
models of OWF collisions.
FE models can provide a comprehensive analysis of internal mechanics—and can
thus be used to obtain accurate values for parameters such as damage length, damage
height and penetration depth of damage to a ship. This information can then be used
to calculate further consequences—e.g.—oil outflow, using models developed by
Sirkar et al. (1997), Krata et al. (2012), and Tavakoli et al. (2008, 2010). One can
also assess the ‘hull girder strength’ after an accident to assess the residual strength
of a ship; although analytical, empirical and probabilistic equations for doing so
are presented by many authors as described by Wang et al. (2002), FE models can
provide a more detailed outlook.
Once the extent of damage (damage length, penetration) is known, equations,
or software like HECSALV and Seatrack Web can also be used to assess further
consequences—economical, environment and social—based on factors such as ship
stability, oil outflow/drift, and water-inrush.
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Other Consequence Models
As with probability, it is possible to assess consequences of accidents qualitatively.
Qualitative models are not commonplace, though they may sometimes be used
during the preliminary stages of risk assessment. A qualitative model generally
relies on a combination of expert judgements and past data. In his Licentiate,
Ohlson (2013) describes a framework where consequences are calculated both
quantitatively and qualitatively.
Probability and consequence models are many and varied, and it is safe to say
that there is no ‘one solution fits all’ model. In an ideal framework, it is therefore
prudent to select a variety of models that can complement each other and provide a
very comprehensive overview of the situation. At the same time, the models should
not be too resource intensive, as this would be very unfeasible.
21.2.2 Existing Risk Management Frameworks
From the get-go, thorough risk management of maritime operations OWFs has
been considered an important task. Several different industrial organisations have
developed integrated frameworks that can assess the risk associated with OWFs.
Examples of such frameworks include SAMSON from MARIN (SAFESHIP 2006;
Kleissen 2006; van der Tak 2010), CRASH/MARCS from DNV (SAFESHIP 2006;
Christensen 2007), and COLLRISK from ANATEC (Ellis et al. 2008b; ANATEC
2014). The existing frameworks are often considered to be robust; they can provide
users with very detailed and comprehensive probability calculations and estimates
for various types of accidents around OWFs. The frameworks are also able to
quantify the consequences in terms of parameters such as damage to property,
environmental damage, loss of human lives, etc. to varying degrees of detail and
accuracy. Furthermore, these frameworks are very adept at performing cost-benefit
analyses of various risk control options.
21.2.2.1 The Gap in Existing Risk Management Frameworks
Despite all their benefits, the existing frameworks have some weaknesses. One
concern that stakeholders often have is that the ship damage estimations in these
frameworks are very simplistic—often relying on basic kinetic energy calculations,
and past accident statistics. This raises doubts as to whether or not these frameworks
are sophisticated and detailed enough to adequately assess the consequences of
complex accidents, such as vessel-turbine collisions. The lack of adequately detailed
consequence assessment may lead to over- or under-designed systems. Moreover,
some of these frameworks may be insufficient as approval tools in countries like
Germany, which require detailed consequence calculations.
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The transparency of different frameworks is also a concern previously high-
lighted by the EU-funded SAFESHIP project and the findings of Ellis et al. (2008b).
The latter report implied that it was impossible to replicate the calculation results
of certain frameworks, as the equations and data values being used were not
evident. Since the study by Ellis et al. (2008b), however, some stakeholders have
made greater efforts to increase the transparency and validity of their models and
frameworks. Both MARIN and DNV-GL—and even companies like ANATEC—
for instance, have produced very clear and detailed reports about their calculation
methods. Despite the significant progress in this area by major industry players,
some of the frameworks widely used by other organisations and governments
still do not conform to an adequate level of transparency. This prevailing lack of
transparency does not bode well for a maturing industry.
Ellis et al. (2008b) also highlighted concerns about harmonisation of various risk
management frameworks. It was noted that despite the initiation of the SAFESHIP
project—which was set up to harmonize navigational risk assessment (NRA)
models—a harmonized framework was not achieved. In their study, Ellis et al.
(2008b) compared the risk assessment results for a specific transnational OWF—
Krieger’s Flak—shared between three different countries: Denmark, Sweden and
Germany. It was noted that the NRA had been conducted by different organizations,
and that the results of the NRA were quite different for the same wind farm. In
fact, each different framework used different tools and models for the calculation
of probability and consequences of various undesirable events. This difference in
probability and consequence calculations arises because different countries and
organizations have different calculation procedures. Going forward, this is clearly
as issue that needs to be addressed particularly given the ambitious plans for trans-
national wind farm.
The lack of harmonization is also a bureaucratic burden as it means that OWF
owners have to follow different procedures in different countries. For offshore
wind to be viable, such administrative problems should be addressed urgently. The
continuing rapid growth of OWFs, increasing sizes and complexity of turbines,
and novel developments such as floating turbines (EWEA 2014) further underline
the urgent need for harmonization. Thus, harmonizing various risk management
frameworks is a high priority task—and one that is advocated by key players in
both the maritime and OWF industries; harmonization concerns, for instance, have
been highlighted repeatedly by organisations such as the European Wind Energy
Association (EWEA 2007).
Lastly, the existing frameworks are often geared towards subject matter experts.
This is not a negative per se; however, OWFs are complex socio-technical systems,
which ideally require various groups of stakeholders from different backgrounds to
work together towards an optimal solution. Bearing this in mind, more should be
done to involve cross-industry stakeholders in the risk management process.
In summary, existing risk management frameworks have four broadly identifi-
able gap areas—lack of harmonization, poor transparency, insufficient stakeholder
involvement, and inadequately detailed consequence calculations. In order to
address these issues, the current chapter describes an improved, unified risk
management framework for vessels operating near OWFs.
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21.3 The Proposed Risk Management Framework
Based on the problems and research gap identified in the previous sections, a novel
theoretical risk management framework has been developed. This framework is
designed to provide a step-by-step approach towards harmonized and transparent
risk management. Currently, the proposed framework describes the risk manage-
ment process for vessels passing near offshore wind farms only. The authors plan
to extend the same framework to include other core maritime risks associated with
OWFs, as listed in Sect. 21.1.2.
Some of the steps shown in the following diagrams (Figs. 21.1–21.9) are
already incorporated into various existing risk assessment models and frameworks.
Therefore, where possible, the authors recommend the relevant tool(s) which can
be used to fulfil the respective steps. It is important to note, however, there is no
single existing model or framework which covers all of the steps—this, in fact, is
the novelty of the current work.
Even though certain models are recommended2 the current chapter does not
provide any specific formulae or detailed explanation (although the reader is
provided with appropriate references). This is primarily because the models and
tools used have been developed by other authors, and detailed explanations of how
the equations are derived are beyond the scope of this chapter. Furthermore, this
framework is still theoretical—to reiterate, the premise of this chapter is to present
the steps that could constitute an improved and unified risk management process. It
is therefore intended that any equations will be presented at a future stage.
Figure 21.1 shows the ‘main’ flowchart of the risk management framework.
The boxes in blue indicate the ‘pre-risk assessment’ or data collection stage. The
green boxes are the core of the framework—the ‘risk assessment/estimation’ stage.
The red boxes indicate the ‘risk evaluation’ and ‘risk management’ stages—i.e.—
stages where decision makers decide if the estimated risk is acceptable, or if further
measures are needed to mitigate the maritime risk associated with offshore wind
farms.
21.3.1 Pre-risk Assessment (Blue): Steps 1–3
Before beginning any risk assessment, it is vital to collect data that can allow one to
calculate the probabilities and consequences of various undesirable events.
The primary data that needs to be collected when performing a risk assessment
around an OWF is, of course, data related to the wind farm itself. A project like
MARE-WINT has a substantial advantage at this stage, since different researchers
try and optimize various different parameters of the OWF. For instance, several
2The selection of the recommended tools/models is partly based on the input/output capabilities
and reasonable resource costs.
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Fig. 21.1 The main/core flowchart for the proposed risk management framework
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researchers work directly on the optimization of the support tower and substructure
components of a turbine, based on the feedback they receive from other fellows
working on blade, gearbox and nacelle design. The work of these researchers is
immensely useful for the current research, as it provides structural information about
the turbine—which allows one to study the consequences of ship collisions in detail.
Similarly, another researcher’s work focused on large eddy simulations over the
wind farm to optimize the wind farm layout. This work can help to identify the inter-
turbine distance, and the proposed layout of the wind farm. The distance between the
turbines can affect both the probability, and the consequences of maritime accidents.
The output of the proposed framework can also be used to provide feedback to other
researchers. This iterative approach can improve the design process for OWFs.
Apart from the feedback from other researchers, one of the most important
sources of information is Automatic Identification System (AIS) data for vessels.
AIS data includes vessel tracks over a given period of time, which can help users to
create a statistical distribution of vessel traffic around a potential OWF site.
AIS data also contains other valuable information such as the speed and mass
of vessels; it may even be possible to identify manoeuvring characteristics of a
vessel, since AIS records the call-signs. AIS data, combined with metrological and
hydrography data can allow for a detailed, enhanced risk assessment. All this data
is collected and recorded by appropriate marine and maritime agencies, and can be
obtained for risk assessment purposes.
21.3.2 Risk Assessment/Estimation (Green): Steps 3–9
The most crucial output from the risk assessment/estimation stage is data-set 7, as
shown on Fig. 21.1. This data-set specifies a total risk value for each type of vessel
on each vessel way around a wind farm. Obtaining this value is the core goal for the
current framework.
In order to obtain this value, the first step is to define the various vessel ways
and the traffic density on each way. This, as stated above, can be done using AIS
recordings around the proposed wind farm area. Generally, AIS data recorded over
a period of one year just prior to the risk assessment, is considered.
The next step is to define standard parameters for each type3 of vessel that
operates on each vessel way. This is done in step 4. A ‘standard’ vessel in this sense
would refer to a vessel that is typical of a particular vessel-type. It is proposed that
standard vessel data be developed by different member states for risk assessment
purposes.
3Vessels can be classified into different types according to classifications present in literature.
Usually, vessels are classified based on their role and the cargo they carry—e.g.—general cargo,
bulk, oil tanker, etc : : : This classification is widely used, and is recommended for the proposed
framework.
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The primary parameters that define the ‘standard’ vessel include speed, mass,
loading condition, and design and construction aspects. The last parameter can be
obtained from IMO documents pertaining to minimum design standards; the other
factors, such as average speed, can be obtained directly from AIS data, and vessel
data over a given period of time. So if, for example, 10 different types of cargo
ships operate on one route adjacent to a wind farm, step four would ‘average’
these 10 cargo ships into one standard cargo ship—which would then be used as
a reference in all calculations involving that ship type. This helps to significantly
reduce computation and analysis time, particularly if an area with high traffic needs
to be assessed. Defining a standard vessel may also allow future case vessels to
be taken into consideration. It is also recommended by the author that various
coastal states maintain a database of 3D models for ‘standard’ vessels that can be
used during the consequence assessment stage for FE (Finite Element) numerical
calculations. These databases can also be regularly updated to accurately reflect the
vessels in a given sea area.
Three main types of risks need to be estimated for each type of vessel, as
indicated by steps 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 in Fig. 21.1. The three risks are the risk of
contact (an accident involving a vessel and a wind turbine), the risk of a collision (an
accident involving 2 or more vessels), and the risk of grounding (an accident where
a vessel runs aground). For each type of risk, the user is required to calculate the
total probability of that risk, and then determine the worst-case consequences—for
each separate type of vessel.
The next few pages contain further flow charts (Figs. 21.2, 21.3, 21.4, 21.5, 21.6,
21.7, 21.8, and 21.9) which explain, step-by-step, how to calculate the probability
and consequence values associated with each type of risk. Each time a user goes
through the entire set of flowcharts, they calculate the risk to all vessels of one
specific type, on one specific route around the OWF. In order to do a complete risk
assessment, the users should repeat the process for as many vessel-types as they
expect, on as many routes there are around the OWF (steps 8 and 9, Fig. 21.1).
Once a user gets to step 6.1, they should add all the probability values for
each specific vessel-type. In step 6.2, they should specify only the worst case
consequences for each specific vessel-type, as quantified in step 5. Combined, these
probability and consequence values will give the overall risk associated with all
vessels of a particular type, on a particular vessel-way around a wind farm.
21.3.3 Risk of Contact Events: Figs. 21.2, 21.3 and 21.4
The first risk that needs to be calculated is the risk from contact events. Contact
events, as stated earlier, involve an accident between a fixed object—in this case,
a turbine—and a ship. In order to calculate the overall risk of contact events, a
user must first calculate the probability of both powered and drifting contact events
individually (Figs. 21.2 and 21.3), and then calculate the consequences (Fig. 21.4).
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Fig. 21.2 Flowchart for step 5.1a: probability of powered contact
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Fig. 21.3 Flow chart for step 5.1b: probability of drifting contact
21.3.3.1 Probability of Powered Contact: Fig. 21.2
A powered contact generally occurs when a vessel is deviating from course
and heading towards a wind farm, and this incorrect action is not corrected in
time. Therefore, in order to calculate the probability the powered contact, it is
recommended that the user follow the geometric-causation probability model as
described in Sect. 21.2.1.1.1.
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Fig. 21.4 Flowchart for step 5.1c: consequences of contact
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Fig. 21.5 Flowchart for step 5.2a: probability of powered collisions
Essentially, a user must first calculate the geometric probability of accident—
i.e.—the probability that a vessel is not following its course and/or is offset from
the vessel way (steps 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 in Fig. 21.2). This is generally done by looking
at AIS data, and determining how many times vessels deviate from their route. The
AIS data can be used to generate a probability distribution, which indicates how
often vessels deviate or are offset from the median line of a vessel way. If AIS data
is not available, it is reasonable to assume that vessel traffic is normally distributed
along the width of the vessel-way.
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Fig. 21.6 Flowchart for step 5.2b: consequences of collisions
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Fig. 21.7 Flowchart for step 5.3a: probability of powered grounding
Calculating the probability of a vessel not performing a corrective action, while
deviating from its course (step 5.1.4 in Fig. 21.2), is slightly more challenging—
particularly because this depends on both human and technical factors. A typical
approach is to use a ‘causation probability’ value from literature; a more sophisti-
cated and thorough approach is use to use risk assessment methods like Fault Trees,
Event Trees and Bayesian Networks to estimate the causation probability (Friis-
Hansen 2008).
21 A Theoretical Risk Management Framework for Vessels Operating Near. . . 381
Fig. 21.8 Flowchart for step 5.3b: probability of drifting grounding
Once a user obtains a geometric probability of contact for all vessels over a given
time period, and an appropriate causation probability, he or she can then multiply
the two values to obtain a total probability of contact for that type of vessel over the
given time period.4
A user of the framework can also multiply this total probability value by another
given geometric equation to calculate the probability of actually hitting a wind
turbine rather than just sailing into a wind farm (step 5.1.5 in Fig. 21.2). Equations
for this purpose are also available in literature (Ellis et al. 2008b), and generally
take into account various factors such as ship length, distance between turbines, and
diameters of the turbine towers.
4The time period that the probability is calculated for is generally 1 year, and therefore the entire
traffic over a period of 1 year must be considered (step 5.1.9 in Fig. 21.2).
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Fig. 21.9 Flowchart for step 5.3c: consequences of grounding
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To calculate the probability of a powered contact, the researcher recommends
using the model and equations developed by SSPA, as described by Ellis et al.
(2008b).
21.3.3.2 Probability of Drifting Contact: Fig. 21.3
Once the probability of powered contact has been calculated, the next step is to
calculate the probability of drifting contact (Fig. 21.3). A vessel is set to be ‘drifting’
when it suffers from loss of engine power. Therefore, in order to calculate the
probability of a drifting contact event, a user must first calculate the probability of a
vessel-type facing an engine breakdown (5.1.10 in Fig. 21.3). This data is generally
available from maritime and ship records.
The next important parameter to calculate during a drifting-contact probability
assessment is the probability that a vessel will actually drift towards an OWF (5.1.11
in Fig. 21.3). This probability is calculated by looking at wind and wave condition
data, and seeing how often the wind or current flows in a direction that can carry
ships towards an OWF.
Next, the user must calculate the time for which a vessel will drift—and whether
or not this time is enough for a contact accident to occur. In order to do so, the
users must consider the width of the traffic distribution on the route, and calculate
the time it would take different vessels to reach the wind farm boundary based on
their position on the route, and the wind and wave conditions. In the same step, one
must also calculate the probability that emergency measures5 will be unsuccessful
or omitted in a given time period (5.1.12 in Fig. 21.3). A successful emergency
measure—in time—will ensure that a certain proportion of the vessel traffic will not
reach the wind farm to cause a contact incident.
Having obtained all the mentioned parameters, a user can multiply them to
calculate the overall probability of a drifting contact for one vessel along an entire
vessel way, over a given period of time. Similar to the powered contact procedure,
the user can further multiply this product by an equation to obtain the probability of
actually drifting and hitting a wind turbine, rather than just drifting into a wind farm
area (5.1.13 in Fig. 21.3).
It is also important to predict the potential speed of the vessel in drift. This is
vital in order to assess the consequences later. Equations from literature (Kleissen
2006; Christensen 2007; Ellis et al. 2008b) can be used to calculate the drift speed,
which depends primarily on current and wind conditions.
For the drifting model, too, the researcher recommends the use of SSPA’s
comprehensive model and equations, as detailed in Ellis et al. (2008b).
5Emergency measures generally include anchoring, repairing the ship in time, or getting help from
a tug vessel. Each of these measures has a certain probability of success/failure depending on
different parameters; typical values for these probabilities are also cited in literature (Ellis et al.
2008b).
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To calculate the overall probability of a type of vessel suffering a contact event,
a user should sum the probability of both, powered, and drifting contact events for
that vessel-type.
21.3.3.3 Consequences of Contact: Fig. 21.4
After calculating the probability of contact, the next step is to calculate the
consequences, using Fig. 21.4. To calculate the consequences to a given type of
vessel, one should use a ‘standard’ reference vessel, as explained earlier in this
section. A user should also consider the structural properties of a wind turbine
(5.1.17 in Fig. 21.4).
The first step (5.1.18 in Fig. 21.4) whilst calculating the consequences is to assess
a range of possible energy dissipation values. The energy dissipation values are
derived from the range kinetic energy of the vessel when it collides with the turbine,
and the energy that the turbine and vessel absorb. Of course, this dissipated energy
depends primarily on the velocity and mass of the vessels. Since the speed and
mass are assumed to be constant values for all vessels of a specific type, the other
parameters that can influence the energy dissipation have to be considered—e.g.—
the angle of collision between the ship and the turbine. Therefore, a user must use
an equation that relates the mass, velocity and the angle of collision, as well as the
location of collision, to the kinetic energy. Such equations have been developed by
Pedersen and Zhang (1998), and by Pedersen (2002, 2010, 2013, 2014).
Once several kinetic energy values have been obtained, the next step is to perform
a detailed numerical finite element analysis (FEA) for the worst case scenario
(5.1.19 in Fig. 21.4)—i.e.—the scenario with the highest energy dissipation.
Although there are simpler methods to calculate consequences—semi-analytical,
probabilistic, and empirical equations being quite common—such methods are
geared more towards ship-ship collisions. Without using FEA, it is hard to capture
the complexity of a ship-turbine collision, and thus assess the consequences in
sufficient detail. A turbine may have many different forces acting upon it, from
the aerodynamics of the blades, to the structural integrity of the soil. Therefore,
although FEA is more resource intensive, it is the method recommended by the
current researcher. Moreover, substantial contemporary literature shows increasing
progress when it comes to FEA analysis of ship-turbine contacts. In particular, Biehl
and Lehmann (2006) have done significant work on describing numerical methods
for ship-turbine collision analysis. Similarly, Dai et al. (2013) describe a procedure
to calculate the damage to a turbine, using FEA, in a scenario where a support
vessel collides with a wind turbine. Most recently, Bela et al. (2015) have used FEA
to assess the crashworthiness of mono-piles.
It is interesting to note that all the above-mentioned papers use the FEA software
LS-DYNA for their analysis. In fact, most of the FEA work on ship-turbine collision
is done using the software LS-DYNA, as it has certain features (structural element
types) which make it ideal for such analysis. Therefore, when it comes to this stage,
the current researcher also recommends the use of LS-DYNA. In order to perform
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a numerical analysis, the user is required to create a 3D model for each type of
vessel, and for each type of wind turbine. The models should incorporate primarily
the structural properties, but it is also important to include the hydrodynamic
and aerodynamic properties for accurate calculations of consequences. A contact
event can then be simulated to assess the energy dissipation in more detail, and to
understand the damage to both structures.
A numerical analysis obviously requires a high level of computational resources.
The intensity of resources is partially reduced since the FEA is only performed for
the worst case scenario for each vessel type, although it is recommended that a
user perform it at several different points along the vessel, and at various locations
around the turbine to ensure the validity of the results. Developing 3D models and
meshing then appropriately consumes a lot of time; in order to minimize this, the
author proposes that various coastal states maintain a database of standard meshed
3D models for all vessel types operating in their waters. This can greatly help to
reduce the resources required for FE modelling.
A numerical FE analysis allows the user to assess the damage to both the ship and
the turbine (5.1.20.1 and 5.1.20.2 in Fig. 21.4). The damage to the wind turbine can
determine the state of the turbine after a contact event, and whether it will collapse
or not. Such information can be used to evaluate how much economical loss will be
incurred.
From the FE calculations, the damage to the ship can be generally visualised,
and quantified in terms of a certain damage length, damage height and a specific
penetration depth. These parameters in turn define the oil and cargo outflow from a
ship, as well as the water inrush. The water inrush can then determine the stability
of a ship, and how much time is available until capsize. Using all this information,
one can quantify the consequences as described in Fig. 21.4. A similar procedure
can be applied to damage incurred by the wind turbine.
For oil outflow, water in rush and stability calculations (5.1.21 in Fig. 21.4),
there are equations and models present in literature (van de Wiel and van Dorp
2011; Wang et al. 2002; Li et al. 2012; Goerlandt and Montewka 2014) that can
allow a user to model these events; such equations directly relate the extent of
damage to the aforementioned parameters. The current researcher, however, uses the
software HECSALV from Herbert-ABS to model these events. HECSALV is a rapid
assessment tool, developed to perform rapid assessment of vessels in distress. It
incorporates widely-used equations to assess several parameters which indicate the
state of damage to a vessel. If the damage extent to a ship is known, HECSALV can
provide oil outflow estimates, water inrush estimates, and time to capsize estimates,
amongst other factors.
The output from HECSALV can be used to estimate evacuation and emergency
response times, and, when combined with Data-sets 2A and 2B from Fig. 21.1
(which can indicate the potential level of emergency response in the area), one can
estimate the consequences in terms such as loss of lives, amount of total oil spill,
and cumulative damage to ship. Methods described by the IMO (2008) can also be
used to calculate the potential number of injuries and fatalities. The spreading of oil
can be further modelled using tools like Seatrack Web—the official HELCOM oil
drift forecasting system.
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The consequences of an accident can also be quantified (5.1.22 in Fig. 21.4) as
monetary figures, using ‘per-unit currency’ values given in literature for different
types of losses and damages—e.g.—each tonne of oil spill costs approx. $60,000
in a given sea area (Christensen 2007). Such monetary values can be obtained for a
variety of consequences—such as loss of one life, loss of a turbine, and damage to
environment. Further expert judgements can also be used to augment these monetary
values.
Alternatively consequences can be quantified into various qualitative ‘levels’,
although this approach is not recommended for the current framework.
Ideally, the process described by Fig. 21.4 should be repeated twice—once for
drifting vessels, and once for powered vessels. The core difference between these
two assessments would be speed of the standard colliding vessel—a vessel in drift
is likely to have a lower collision speed with a turbine. After quantifying the
consequences, it is recommended that only the worst-case consequence values be
documented for the next stage in the framework—but if the user wishes, they can
mention the worst-case consequences for both drifting and powered contact events
separately.
21.3.4 Risk of Collision Events: Figs. 21.5 and 21.6
A ‘collision’ event refers to an accident between 2 or more ships—although the
likelihood of there being more than 2 ships is extremely rare. When calculating
the risk of collision, it is only necessary to assess the risk of powered collisions.
Drifting collisions are extremely unlikely at sea, since it is highly improbable that
two vessels will drift towards each other and collide.
21.3.4.1 Probability of Powered Collision: Fig. 21.5
As with powered contact probability, the author recommends using the geometric-
causation probability model as described in Sect. 21.2.1.1.1 to calculate the
probability of powered collision. Thus, assessing the probability of a powered
collision involves the multiplication of two main factors (5.2.4 in Fig. 21.5)—the
geometric collision candidates and the causation probability.
The causation probability, as mentioned earlier, is the probability of corrective
action being taken; values of causation probability can easily be obtained from
various literature sources (Fujii et al. 1974, 1984; Fujii and Mizuki 1998; MacDuff
1974; Ellis et al. 2008b). Alternatively, it can calculated using historical accident
data and methods like Bayesian Networks (see Sect. 21.2.1.1.1.2).
The number of geometric collision candidates for collision indicates the likeli-
hood of two vessels occupying the same space, at any given time, if no corrective
action is taken. In literature (Pedersen 2010; Li et al. 2012), one can find many
equations which provide values for the geometric collision candidates, based on the
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AIS information for a given area. These equations are different for different types of
collision situations; on any given vessel-way, there can be many potential types of
collision situations—e.g.—head-on situations, overtaking situations, and crossing
situations. It is therefore important, to clearly choose a type of collision situation
(step 5.2.1) before beginning a collision assessment.
After a user has the values for geometric probability of collision, and appropriate
values for causation factors, they can multiply the two values to obtain a total
probability value. This probability value indicates the frequency of a given type of
collision, between all vessels of two specific types, along an entire vessel-way, for
a given period of time. The process should be repeated until all possible collision
types and vessel-types have been analysed.
Once the probability of each different type of collision has been calculated, the
user can sum all these values (step 5.2.7) to get a final probability value: this value
would represent the frequency of all types of collision, between one specific vessel
type and all types of vessels, along an entire vessel-way, for a given period of time.
The current researcher recommends using the software tool iWRAP, developed
by IALA (Friis-Hansen 2008). iWRAP incorporates all of the steps indicated in
Fig. 21.5. It allows users to assess the probability of different types of collisions, and
can directly assess the geometric collision candidates based on AIS data. iWRAP
also has several different causation factors values and ship domain data included,
which allows users to perform integrated calculations. The theory and equations
behind iWRAP are well-documented, and commonly used by many practitioners.
Furthermore, iWRAP is endorsed and recommended by the IMO as an ideal tool to
calculate the risk of collision and compare base and future case traffic scenarios—
which makes it the perfect tool for the job.
21.3.4.2 Consequences of a Collision: Fig. 21.6
Calculating the consequences for collisions is, in some ways, similar to calculating
the consequences of a contact event. One major difference is that the user must
select a type of striking ship (5.2.8 in Fig. 21.6), instead of a type of turbine.
Another prime difference is that there is no separate step for energy dissipation
calculation. Instead, a range of values for the damage length and damage penetration
to each ship are calculated from the very start (5.2.9.1 and 5.2.9.2 in Fig. 21.6).
In literature, it is easy to find many equations that relate various parameters—
ship speed, mass, loading condition, design, and angle of collision, to name but
a few—to damage length and damage penetration in cases of ship-ship collisions
(Wang et al. 2002; Pedersen 2010; Li et al. 2012). For the purposes of this
framework, the researcher suggests using SIMCOL (Brown 2001, 2002a, b) to
assess varying damage lengths and penetration depths with varying factors such
as type of striking vessel and angle of collision. SIMCOL uses semi-analytical
and empirical equations, which allows for extremely rapid assessment of collision
situations with varying parameters.
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Once the user has obtained a range of values for damage lengths and penetration
depths, he or she should choose the case with the most severe damage to the struck
vessel (5.2.10 in Fig. 21.6), to analyse further in terms of oil outflow, stability and
water in rush (5.2.11 in Fig. 21.6). Since each type of vessel is analysed based on
a standard model, only one case needs to be assessed in detailed. For the chosen
case, the consequences can be calculated and quantified in a similar manner to the
contact scenario (Sect. 21.3.3.3). It is again recommended to use HECSALV for
oil outflow, water in rush and stability calculation, whilst tools like Seatrack Web
from HELCOM can be used to model the spread of oil. In other words, 5.2.12 from
Fig. 21.6 can be calculated in a similar manner to step 5.1.22 from Fig. 21.4.
Finally, the worst case consequences for each type of vessel, in case of collision
events, should then be clearly recorded.
21.3.5 Risk of Grounding Events: Figs. 21.7, 21.8 and 21.9
A grounding event is one where the ship runs into an area of shallow depth, thus
causing the bottom of hull to scrape along solid ground, rock or reefs. This type of
accident is typically not considered when analysing the operation of ships around
offshore wind farms. As the number of wind farms increase, however, the limited
sea space is reduced. Furthermore, OWFs are often built in shallow waters, and there
is a risk of shifting sand banks in some areas. Such factors make an assessment of
grounding risk a priority.
21.3.5.1 Probability of Powered Grounding: Fig. 21.7
It is easy to find an abundance of literature on models that calculate the probability
of powered groundings (Mazaheri et al. 2014). The current framework recommends
a simple approach for this assessment—by suggesting the user to assess the powered
grounding probability in a manner similar to the one applied when assessing
powered contact probability (Fig. 21.2). In fact, between the two approaches
(Fig. 21.2 and 21.7), there is only one fundamental difference: when calculating
the probability of powered contact, the users have an option to calculate the chance
of a ship actually hitting a wind turbine, or just simply sailing into an OWF area;
such an option is not available when calculating the powered grounding probability.
To ensure consistency, the researcher recommends the use of iWRAP, which
provides a robust calculation procedure for powered grounding. Using iWRAP
meets consistency criterion, as it is suggested for collision calculations as well.
iWRAP is also able to calculate the probability of grounding for vessel ways with
varying geometries and spatial features.
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21.3.5.2 Probability of Drifting Grounding: Fig. 21.8
In order to be consistent, the current researcher recommends following a similar
procedure to calculate the probability of drifting grounding, as was detailed for
assessing the probability of drifting contact events (Fig. 21.3). Once again, the
only difference between the process described in Fig. 21.3 and the one described
in Fig. 21.8 is that the former allows users to calculate the probability of actually
hitting an object, rather than just the probability of drifting into a general area—
whereas the latter does not. The researcher again recommends the use of the iWRAP
model and/or all its associated equations.
To calculate the overall probability of a type of vessel grounding, a user should
sum the probability of powered and drifting grounding events, for that vessel-type.
21.3.5.3 Consequences of Grounding: Fig. 21.9
Many different approaches exist to calculate the consequences of grounding events
(Mazaheri et al. 2013, 2014, 2015a, b; Zhu et al. 2002). To assess the consequences
of the grounding in a rapid, novel manner, the current frameworks suggests
following a similar approach as when assessing the consequences of a collision
(Fig. 21.6)—with some differences, of course.
The major difference between the approach outlined in Figs. 21.6 and 21.9 is
the exclusion of the ‘striking ship’ from the latter, and the inclusion of ‘grounding
type’. Another crucial, but related difference is of course that the consequences are
only calculated for one ship at a time, instead of two.
The researcher recommends the use of the same tools and models as used in
Fig. 21.6, but with one exception: instead of using SIMCOL to assess the damage
length and penetration depth, it is suggested that the procedure outlined by Zhu et al.
(2002) is used instead. In this latter procedure, the authors developed equations to
allow for a quick assessment of grounding damages (step 5.3.16 in Fig. 21.9), which
makes it ideal for use in the current framework.
For the subsequent consequence quantification and assessment, it is once again
recommended to use the tools HECSALV and Seatrack Web, along with the per-unit
values provided in literature, for various different types of losses.
Ideally, a user should go over Fig. 21.9 twice—once for powered grounding
accidents, and once for drifting grounding accidents. The only parameter that
will significantly vary between the two cases will be the speed of the grounding.
After quantifying the consequences, it is recommended that only the worst-case
consequence values are documented for subsequent risk evaluation; if the user
wishes, however, they can mention the worst-case consequences for both drifting
and powered grounding events separately.
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21.3.6 Risk Evaluation and Management (Red): Fig. 21.1
21.3.6.1 Risk Evaluation: ALARP and Acceptance Criteria
Having estimated the risk to each type of vessel (steps 5 to 9 in Fig. 21.1), the next
steps (10–11) involve evaluating the probability and consequence values against
certain ‘acceptability’ criteria. This allows users of the framework to judge whether
the risk—to each particular type of vessel along each particular route near the
OWF—is acceptably low enough, or not. If a risk to one or more types of vessels
is deemed to be too high, the user can implement some risk control measures, and
repeat the entire process as described by the framework.
Acceptability criteria are generally set out after consultation with various
stakeholders. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has conducted several
studies in which the acceptable criteria for various vessel types are clearly set
out (IMO 2006, 2007a, b, 2008). Thus far, however, there have not been any
acceptability discussions on vessels specifically operating near OWFs, on an
international level.
Despite this, during the planning of OWFs, governments may require the OWF
developer to clearly state the acceptable risk. Therefore, companies that carry out
navigational risk assessment studies for OWFs occasionally develop acceptability
criteria, or matrixes, on a case-by-case basis (ANATEC 2014).
One of the most common ways of checking whether or not a risk is acceptable is
through the use of an ALARP diagram (Ellis et al. 2008a). An ALARP diagram is a
log-log graph with probability values on the x-axis, and consequence values on the
y-axis.
An ALARP diagram can be divided into three sections—Broadly Acceptable,
ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable), and Unacceptable. To demonstrate
what an output from the current framework might look like, the author has
developed an ALARP diagram using dummy data (Fig. 21.10).
The top right corner, above the white dotted line is the Unacceptable region.
Risks in this area cannot be accepted by society and/or stakeholders. The region in
the bottom left, below the other white dotted line, is the Broadly Acceptable region.
Ideally, probability and consequence values should be in the region, but it might be
unfeasible and costly to design the system for this to be the case. The region in the
middle, bounded by the two white dotted lines is the ALARP region. This region
indicates the levels of probability and respective consequences are acceptable, and
feasible to achieve.6
The white ellipses can represent different types of vessels—passing vessels (bulk,
general cargo, passenger, RO-PAX, etc.) but also support vessels, SAR vessels
6The aim of the current framework is to harmonize risk management procedures and not the
acceptance criteria. Thus, the current framework does not specify limits for the different regions on
an ALARP diagram—it is up to the individual maritime administrations and licensing authorities
to decide what is ‘acceptable’ after close consultations with stakeholders.
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Fig. 21.10 A proposed output of the risk management framework, generated using dummy data
and installation and decommissioning vessels. Each of the grey ellipses indicates
different OWF options—various wind turbine layouts, and the effect of various risk
control options such as enhanced navigational aids and VTS. The size of the ellipses
indicates the uncertainty associated with the calculations; the smaller the size, the
more accurate a calculation or estimation is likely to be.
Even if the risk to all vessels is considered to be acceptable, it is still important
to monitor and review the risks at regular periods over the lifecycle of an OWF. This
is particularly important because, over time, some crucial parameters may change;
changes may include variations in the standard types of vessels, climate conditions,
and technological advances.
21.3.6.2 Risk Management
If a wind farm option lies in the Unacceptable region, OWF owners may attempt
to mitigate and manage the risk to push it down to the ALARP region. Generally,
there are four main ways in which risk can be managed, as identified by various
authors and organisations, including the Health and Safety Executive (HSE UK):
Risk Avoidance, Retention, Transfer or Reduction and Mitigation.
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There is a fundamental difference between risk mitigation and risk avoidance—
in the former, the system or process is ‘tweaked’ to deal with a risk, in the latter the
system or process is changed so the risk is eliminated entirely, if possible.
To better understand and summarize the four risk management methods, consider
a ship going from point A to B, and passing a wind-farm en-route. The ship therefore
faces a possible risk of collision with the wind turbines. If the ship owner wishes to
avoid this risk of collision, they might opt for a different route altogether, and thus
eliminate a particular risk (although this might give rise to other risks). This would
be an example of risk avoidance.
Alternatively, the ship owners may decide either that the ship colliding with wind
turbines will not harm their interests, or the probability of collision is so low that
they are not concerned; they thus decide to do nothing about the risk. This option
would demonstrate risk retention.
A third option would be to get the ship insured, so that in the case of a collision,
the insurance company is responsible for the consequences. This third option
exemplifies risk transfer.
Lastly, the ship owner may simply implement some measures that reduce
the probability or consequences of collision within the system itself, without
eliminating the risk entirely. Such measures could include, for instance, a good
captain or state-of-art equipment. This would be an example of risk reduction or
mitigation.
To control risk then—primarily via risk avoidance, transfer and mitigation—
there are several types of barriers that can be implemented: physical, administrative
and supervisory or management barriers. Physical barriers, as the name implies,
physically separate the hazard and potential target. Administrative and supervisory
and management generally influence, and are influenced by, the human elements
in systems and processes. Typically, barriers are designed to either improve the
reliability of the system (reduce probability of failures and accidents), or to improve
the safety of the system (reduce and mitigate the consequences in case of an
accident)—although it is possible to have barriers that reduce both the probability
and consequences of accidents.
Examples of typical barriers in the maritime domain, that can help to reduce
the probability of accidents near OWFs, include measures such VTS (vessel traffic
service) monitoring, pilotage, traffic separation schemes, and even sonars (Fricke
and Rolfes 2013). There are several consequence-reducing measures as well,
proposed by authors such as Graczykowski and Holnicki-Szulc (2009) and Ren
and Ou (2009); both their papers describe and analyse the use of ‘crashworthiness
devices’ around the turbine tower, which can minimize the impact of the vessel
contact events. The effects of barriers and risk control options can be quantified
by going through the process described in the framework (Fig. 21.1), and updating
the probability and consequence values for each type of vessel, as necessary. The
introduction of VTS, might for example, have an effect on the causation probability
of accidents, and this would be reflected in the probability calculations of Fig. 21.1.
Similarly, designing an implement to absorb the energy in contact events would
mean updated calculations and results for the consequence assessment in Fig. 21.1
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Fig. 21.11 The FSA Process (IMO 2007a)
It is of course, important that risk management measures are feasible, and cost
effective. In the maritime domain, the IMO’s Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)
process was developed for exactly this purpose—to assess the feasibility of risk
reduction measures (and new system design). The FSA process consists of 5 steps,
as shown in Fig. 21.11.
A detailed breakdown of each of the FSA steps is beyond the scope of this
chapter. The risk management framework developed by the researcher attempts to
cover all these steps. The risk estimation described by Figs. 21.1, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4,
21.5, 21.6, 21.7, 21.8, and 21.9 cover steps 1 and 2 of the FSA process, whilst the
current sub-section deals with steps 3–5. Several IMO documents (IMO 2007a, b,
2008) include specific equations to calculate the ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ of risk reduction
measures.
Such analyses are also included in other literature sources such as reports by
Christensen (2007) and Kleissen (2006). These equations help decision makers
decide if risks associated with a project are worth reducing, or if a project should be
abandoned.
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21.4 Outlook and Conclusions
With the growing number and sizes of offshore wind farms and turbines, it has
become increasingly necessary to conduct proactive risk assessment. Combining
the growth of OWFs with developments such as floating wind turbines, and transna-
tional wind farms, one can clearly see that existing frameworks are inadequate. In
particular, existing frameworks are not capable of addressing transboundary issues,
as risk assessment calculation procedures vary across countries.
This book chapter proposes an urgently-needed harmonized and transparent risk
management framework for vessels operating near OWFs. Primarily developed to
address the concerns with existing solutions (Sect. 21.2.2.1), the current framework
outlines a step-by-step approach, and incorporates various recommended probabil-
ity and consequence models in a cohesive manner.
Having one uniform framework across several different countries is a big step
towards achieving continued growth of OWFs as it can simplify the administrative
burdens that developers currently face. A clear, harmonized, step-by-step framework
might also encourage smaller OWF owners to submit bids and tenders for OWFs.
A simpler, transparent framework may also encourage greater participation from
a broader range of stakeholders, thus allowing for a more comprehensive risk
assessment. The outputs of this framework can be plotted an ALARP graph
(Fig. 21.10)—which can enable quicker, more well-informed decisions from multi-
ple stakeholders.
The proposed framework can, of course, be developed further. One of the
immediate next steps will be to define specific equations for each relevant step.
The authors also plan to expand this framework to take into account other maritime
operations, rather than just vessels passing by OWFs. The ALARP diagram for the
proposed framework will also be developed further to incorporate a third cost axis,
which will visualize the results of cost-benefit analysis for various wind farm layouts
and risk control options. The proposed framework is, so far, purely theoretical;
however, the authors intend to apply this framework to a series of existing and
proposed wind farms to validate the work practically in the near future.
Ultimately, the only way that the current levels of OWF growth can be sustained
is if both the maritime and OWF industry understand the concerns of the other; the
proposed framework is designed to enable just that. To continue building OWFs, we
must demonstrate that they are viable, safe and reliable—and the way to do that is
through proper, thorough risk management frameworks.
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